Ключевые слова: цивилистический процесс; судебное решение и его отмена; принцип запрета поворота к худшему; принцип правовой определенности; апелляционное обжалование; пределы рассмотрения гражданского дела судом вышестоящей инстанции.
ON THE PRINCIPLE PROHIBITING A TURN FOR THE WORSE IN THE MODERN CIVIL PROCEDURE
S.F. Afanasyev
Saratov State Law Academy
Sergey F. Afanasyev – Doctor of Law, Professor, Head of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Department of the Saratov State Law Academy, Head of the Theory and Sectorial Problems of Legal Policy Sector of the Saratov Branch of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Scientific Advisory Council at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
In this paper, the issue of the possibility of a wider introduction into the modern civil procedure of the principle of prohibiting a turn for the worse is considered. It is proved that in the framework of the resolution of private law disputes by the judicial authorities, this principle should be presented in one or another full-format version, whereas in the resolution of public law cases by the courts, this is not so obvious. The latter is explained by the need for separate consideration by the mechanism of legal procedural regulation of the legal characteristics of the substantive legal relations that are the subject of judicial proceedings. There is clearly insufficient legislative regulation on this important issue, and therefore it should be carried out systematically, taking into account the peculiarities of the Civil Procedure Code, Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, Administrative Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.
Keywords: civil procedure; judicial decision and its cancellation; the principle of prohibiting a turn for the worse; the principle of legal certainty; appeal; the limits of consideration of a civil case by a higher court.
* * *
Известно, что римский принцип запрета поворота к худшему (non reformatio in peius) всегда находился в органической связи с другим значимым правилом – сколько жалобы, столько и решения (tantum devolutum quantum appellatum)[37]. Впрочем, это утверждение не распространяется на классический когниционный процесс, дозволявший судье независимо от волеизъявления апеллировавшего лица выносить более суровые вердикты, нежели исходившие от суда первой инстанции