of entertaining the other. The choice is
not made between two difficulties;—it is merely
fancied to be made between two impossibilities. Now of the former, there
are degrees – but of the latter, none – just as our impertinent letter-writer has already suggested. A task
may be more or less difficult; but it is either possible or not possible – there are no gradations. It
might be more
difficult to overthrow the Andes than an ant-hill; but it
can be no more
impossible to annihilate the matter of the one than the matter of the other. A man may jump ten feet with less
difficulty than he can jump twenty, but the
impossibility of his leaping to the moon is not a whit less than that of his leaping to the dog-star.
Since all this is undeniable: since the choice of the mind is to be made between impossibilities of conception: since one impossibility cannot be greater than another: and since, thus, one cannot be preferred to another: the philosophers who not only maintain, on the grounds mentioned, man's idea of infinity but, on account of such supposititious idea, infinity itself—are plainly engaged in demonstrating one impossible thing to be possible by showing how it is that some one other thing – is impossible too. This, it will be said, is nonsense; and perhaps it is – indeed I think it very capital nonsense – but forego all claim to it as nonsense of mine.
The readiest mode, however, of displaying the fallacy of the philosophical argument on this question, is by simply adverting to a fact respecting it which has been hitherto quite overlooked – the fact that the argument alluded to both proves and disproves its own proposition. "The mind is impelled," say the theologians and others, "to admit a First Cause, by the superior difficulty it experiences in conceiving cause beyond cause without end." The quibble, as before, lies in the word "difficulty" – but here what is it employed to sustain? A First Cause. And what is a First Cause? An ultimate termination of causes. And what is an ultimate termination of causes? Finity – the Finite. Thus the one quibble, in two processes, by God knows how many philosophers, is made to support now Finity and now Infinity – could it not be brought to support something besides? As for the quibblers—